UK Plans Tough New Undersea Cable Laws Despite No Confirmed Sabotage in Scotland

The UK Government is proposing prison sentences of up to 14 years for deliberate attacks on undersea cables and pipelines, despite having identified no confirmed act of sabotage against subsea infrastructure in Scottish waters in the public evidence examined for the new legislation.

The proposals, published on 22 October 2026, would introduce new criminal offences covering intentional interference, reckless conduct and gross negligence affecting the electricity, gas and telecommunications infrastructure that connects Britain to the wider world.

Scotland has experienced numerous undersea cable failures, including incidents affecting the Western Isles, Jura, Islay, Colonsay, Orkney and Shetland. However, the cases documented in official records and industry reports have involved fishing vessels, suspected fishing activity, environmental conditions or technical faults rather than established deliberate attacks.

In June 2026, the UK Government told Parliament that suspicious activity near British subsea communications cables was increasingly being observed but had not resulted in incidents affecting those cables. It also confirmed that fishing and anchoring were responsible for most recorded damage.

The Government’s position is that the existing legislation is outdated and that increasing reliance on undersea infrastructure requires stronger preventative measures before a serious hostile attack occurs.

However, the difference between demonstrated damage, suspected sabotage and potential future threats raises questions about how the new offences will operate, particularly for Scotland’s fishing industry and other legitimate maritime activities.

What the UK Government Is Proposing

The White Paper, titled Critical Undersea Infrastructure Security and Resilience, proposes a three-tier criminal penalty system.

Deliberate interference with critical undersea infrastructure could carry a maximum prison sentence of 14 years. Reckless conduct could attract up to ten years, while gross negligence could result in imprisonment for up to two years. Unlimited fines are also proposed.

The Government is additionally considering whether even stronger penalties should apply in exceptionally serious cases involving danger to life or national security.

The proposed offences would cover more than the physical cutting of cables. They could also apply to attempts, preparations, certain forms of electronic interference and conduct that compromises the security of infrastructure without necessarily destroying it.

The proposals would be accompanied by new security and resilience duties for subsea telecommunications operators and powers allowing ministers to direct protective action during serious national security threats.

These measures are not yet law. They are being considered through a consultation running until 14 January 2027.

What Has Actually Happened in Scottish Waters?

Scotland’s recorded experience demonstrates that undersea cables can fail with serious consequences even when no hostile activity is involved.

The following incidents are documented through electricity network records, Scottish Government correspondence and assessments published by the fishing industry.

These are five documented examples, not an exhaustive register of every submarine cable failure in Scottish waters. In particular, a cable fault with no established hostile cause should not automatically be classified as a proven accident of a specific type.

Shetland’s 2022 Cable Failure Was Initially Surrounded by Sabotage Speculation

The SHEFA-2 failure of 20 October 2022 provides a particularly revealing example of how suspected sabotage can differ from the findings of an actual investigation.

The damage left much of Shetland without internet and telephone services, disrupting businesses, communications and electronic payment systems.

The failure occurred against the background of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and shortly after explosions had destroyed sections of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea.

Concerns were raised that the Shetland incident might represent deliberate interference with critical infrastructure.

However, correspondence subsequently released by the Scottish Government established that the Maritime and Coastguard Agency had identified a UK-registered fishing vessel as responsible.

Government officials recorded that the damage was accidental and that there were no suspicious circumstances.

The information was not immediately made public in full. The Scottish Government’s freedom-of-information release later documented the correspondence and the conclusions available to officials.

In May 2023, the Scottish Government again confirmed in response to a parliamentary question that the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency had identified a UK-registered fishing vessel as the cause.

The incident demonstrates why distinguishing a possible act of sabotage from a confirmed accident matters. The disruption was real, but the suspicion of hostile activity was not substantiated.

Fishing Activity Has Continued to Damage Scottish Cables

Shetland experienced further communications disruption during 2025.

On 26 July, a section of the SHEFA-2 fibre-optic cable was damaged approximately nine kilometres off Orkney, affecting broadband services in Shetland.

The owner of a fishing vessel reported to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency that the vessel might have damaged the cable.

A subsequent report prepared for the Shetland Fishermen’s Association and published in November 2025 attributed the incident to a mainland-registered scallop dredger. The report also alleged that the vessel’s automatic identification system had been switched off.

That account is an industry assessment rather than a published criminal conviction, and the available material does not establish every circumstance surrounding the vessel’s navigation.

Another SHEFA-2 cable failure occurred on 3 October 2025 near Orkney.

This affected some internet service providers for approximately three weeks before repairs were completed later in the month.

The fishing-industry report attributed the damage to storm activity and conditions affecting the cable in shallow water.

These incidents demonstrate an established operational problem involving cables laid through waters also used for commercial fishing.

They also raise questions about whether cables are sufficiently buried, protected or clearly identified on navigational charts.

What Do the Government’s Own Figures Show?

On 17 June 2026, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology answered a parliamentary question concerning suspicious activity by foreign state-linked vessels around British subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

The Government did not provide the requested annual figures for suspicious vessel incidents.

Instead, it explained that most cable faults were caused by fishing and anchoring activity.

It cited International Cable Protection Committee figures indicating that approximately 84% of global submarine telecommunications cable faults resulted from fishing and anchoring combined.

The remaining 16% were attributed to geological events, seabed abrasion or defective equipment.

These are global figures and should not be interpreted as a specific Scottish breakdown. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the predominance of accidental and operational damage within the international submarine communications cable industry.

The Government also acknowledged an increase in suspicious activity near subsea infrastructure, but stated that it had not resulted in incidents affecting the cables.

Royal Navy and Joint Maritime Security Centre monitoring was cited as part of the continuing response to those perceived threats.

The Government’s June answer concerned telecommunications cables. It was not a comprehensive statement ruling out every possible hostile incident involving all electricity cables, pipelines or offshore installations.

Europe Has Experienced Confirmed Sabotage — The Nord Stream Explosions

The most consequential confirmed deliberate destruction of undersea energy infrastructure among the European cases examined occurred on 26 September 2022.

Explosions damaged the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines beneath the Baltic Sea, near the Danish island of Bornholm.

The pipelines had been constructed to carry Russian natural gas towards Germany. The explosions caused extensive damage and substantial gas releases.

The question of responsibility remained disputed for several years, with different governments and commentators offering competing explanations.

However, German criminal investigations have now produced formal charges against a former Ukrainian military officer and allegations concerning the involvement of Ukrainian state authorities.

Who Do German Prosecutors Say Was Responsible?

On 2 July 2026, Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor announced that charges had been filed against Ukrainian national Serhii K., publicly identified in subsequent court reporting as former Ukrainian military officer Serhii Kuznietsov.

The indictment alleges that Kuznietsov and other Ukrainian military personnel developed a plan to destroy the pipelines on behalf of state authorities in Ukraine.

According to the prosecutors, the intended purpose was to permanently interrupt Russian gas deliveries and prevent Russia from using revenue from those supplies to finance its war.

The alleged operation involved a group of professional divers, a skipper and an explosives specialist.

Prosecutors say the group used a sailing yacht rented in Germany through intermediaries with false identification documents and transported explosives to waters near Bornholm.

Explosive devices were allegedly attached to the pipelines before detonating on 26 September 2022.

In September 2026, the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg authorised Kuznietsov’s case to proceed to trial. Proceedings began on 14 October.

The charges include alleged participation in a war crime involving an attack on civilian infrastructure, causing an explosion, damaging structures and disrupting public services.

Kuznietsov disputes the allegations. The opening of a trial establishes that prosecutors have presented a case sufficient for judicial examination; it does not establish criminal guilt.

German investigators have also pursued other Ukrainian suspects. On 19 August 2026, the Federal Public Prosecutor announced the arrest in Croatia of another Ukrainian national, identified as Vladimir Z., suspected of participating in the diving operation.

As of this report, the German prosecution has not established in a final judicial finding that President Volodymyr Zelensky personally ordered, approved or directed the sabotage.

Zelensky has denied Ukrainian state involvement. German prosecutors’ allegation that Ukrainian state authorities directed the operation is therefore an important, contested claim that remains before the courts.

Nord Stream Is Not the Only European Case Under Investigation

Other incidents involving damaged undersea infrastructure in the Baltic have also prompted criminal investigations, although their circumstances differ considerably from the deliberate use of explosives against Nord Stream.

On 25 December 2024, the tanker Eagle S was associated with damage to the Estlink 2 electricity cable and several communications cables between Finland and Estonia.

Finnish prosecutors alleged that the vessel dragged an anchor along the seabed and that members of its crew failed to respond appropriately to evidence of the problem.

On 27 August 2026, the Helsinki Court of Appeal overturned an earlier jurisdictional decision and ruled that Finnish courts could hear the criminal case.

That decision allowed prosecution proceedings to continue. It was not a conviction establishing deliberate sabotage by the crew.

Another case demonstrates how an initial sabotage investigation can reach a different conclusion.

In January 2025, a communications cable between Latvia and Sweden was damaged, prompting Swedish authorities to seize a vessel and open a sabotage investigation.

On 3 February, Swedish prosecutors announced that the investigation had established the damage was not sabotage. They attributed it to a combination of severe weather, equipment deficiencies and poor seamanship.

These cases demonstrate that damage to undersea infrastructure must be investigated individually. Physical damage alone does not establish hostile intent, while a finding that an incident was accidental does not remove the possibility of negligence.

Could Scottish Fishing Crews Face Criminal Liability?

The proposed legislation has direct implications for vessels operating in Scottish waters because it extends beyond deliberate sabotage.

Reckless conduct could attract a maximum sentence of ten years, while gross negligence could carry up to two years.

An ordinary accident would not automatically satisfy either legal test. The Government proposes distinctions based on intention, conscious disregard of substantial risk and conduct falling far below the expected standard of care.

Nevertheless, fishing vessels operate equipment capable of contacting or disturbing the seabed, including trawls and dredges.

As more electricity and telecommunications cables are installed around Scotland, particularly to support offshore renewable energy, the potential for interaction between fishing activity and cable routes is increasing.

The Shetland Fishermen’s Association has argued that cable developers should use more protective installation methods wherever practical, including burial or appropriate seabed protection.

The association has also raised concerns about the consequences of expanding cable corridors through established fishing grounds.

These are significant practical issues for the proposed legislation.

Where damage occurs because cable routes are inadequately protected, poorly mapped or exposed through changing seabed conditions, the circumstances may differ substantially from a vessel deliberately or recklessly interfering with known infrastructure.

Future legislation will need to define responsibility clearly enough for investigators, cable operators and vessel owners to understand how the offences apply.

Why Is the Government Proposing the Laws Now?

The Government’s stated justification is preventative.

It argues that the existing offence framework for damaging telecommunications cables dates largely from the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885 and does not adequately reflect modern electricity transmission, digital communications or the potential consequences of hostile interference.

The White Paper also cites activity by Russian military vessels and submarines around critical undersea infrastructure.

British defence authorities have disclosed operations tracking Russian submarines believed to have been surveying cables.

That activity is presented as evidence of an evolving security threat, although surveillance or reconnaissance does not itself establish that a cable has been damaged.

The Government also wants cable operators to adopt more consistent security and resilience standards, improve incident reporting and prepare for emergencies involving multiple infrastructure failures.

These objectives are distinct from creating criminal penalties. Some provisions are designed to improve operational preparedness even where no offence has occurred.

Legislation intended to prevent a future attack does not necessarily require a previous attack within the territory concerned. However, the evidence supporting a preventative measure remains relevant when assessing its necessity, proportionality, costs and effects on lawful maritime activity.

The Questions Scotland Needs Answered

The public evidence examined for this report establishes repeated cable damage in Scottish waters but no confirmed deliberate sabotage among the documented Scottish incidents.

It also establishes that the UK Government has acknowledged increasing suspicious maritime activity without identifying resulting damage to British telecommunications cables in its June parliamentary response.

Against that background, several questions remain relevant to the proposed legislation.

How many confirmed deliberate attacks on Scottish subsea electricity cables, telecommunications cables or pipelines have occurred during the past decade?

How many investigations have resulted in criminal prosecutions, and under which existing laws?

What incidents demonstrate that current criminal penalties were inadequate?

How will investigators distinguish ordinary fishing accidents from gross negligence or reckless behaviour, particularly where cables are not buried or where their location has changed?

What additional costs will the proposed security duties impose on operators, and could those costs ultimately affect electricity or communications customers?

The published consultation does not provide a complete Scotland-specific answer to those questions.

What Happens Next?

The UK Government’s consultation closes on 14 January 2027. Ministers will then consider the responses before deciding whether and how to introduce legislation.

The proposals do not immediately create new criminal offences or increase existing sentences.

They would apply to infrastructure of substantial importance to Scotland, particularly as additional offshore electricity connections and international communications cables are developed.

The documented Scottish incidents demonstrate that accidents and equipment failures can cause serious disruption without sabotage.

The Nord Stream case demonstrates that deliberate attacks on undersea energy infrastructure are possible and that responsibility may take years to establish through criminal proceedings.

Whether stronger UK penalties, new regulatory duties and additional ministerial powers are proportionate to the risks will be examined during the consultation and legislative process.

The distinction remains central: Scotland has suffered real damage to its undersea infrastructure, but a confirmed campaign of deliberate sabotage in Scottish waters has not been established in the public evidence reviewed for this investigation.

Sources

Critical Undersea Infrastructure Security and Resilience: Proposals for Modernising the UK’s Legislation, UK Government, 22 October 2026.

Subsea Cable Saboteurs Face Jail and Unlimited Fines Under New Security Crackdown, UK Government, 22 October 2026.

Subsea Telecommunications Infrastructure: Suspicious Vessel Activity and Cable Damage, UK Parliament, written answer from the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, 17 June 2026.

Damage to the Telecommunications Cable Between the Scottish Mainland and Shetland, October 2022, Scottish Government, Freedom of Information release, 15 January 2024.

Jura–Tayvallich Submarine Cable: Fault and Replacement, Scottish and Southern Electricity Networks, August 2020, published by Argyll and Bute Council.

SSEN Distribution to Proceed With Replacement Cable Between Skye and Harris, SSE, 17 December 2020.

Energy Developments in Shetland and Their Interactions With Fisheries, Section 3.18: Subsea Cables, Shetland Fishermen’s Association and Voar Energy, November 2025.

Subsea Telecommunications Cables: Resilience and Crisis Preparedness — Written Evidence, European Subsea Cables Association, submitted to the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, 2025.

Indictment Concerning the Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Explosions, German Federal Public Prosecutor General, 2 July 2026.

Nord Stream Pipeline Explosions: Indictment Admitted for Trial, Hanseatic Higher Regional Court, Hamburg, September 2026.

Arrest in Relation to the Suspected Sabotage Against the Nord Stream Gas Pipelines, German Federal Public Prosecutor General, 19 August 2026.

Eagle S Cable Damage Case: Court of Appeal Decision HelHO:2026:9, Helsinki Court of Appeal, 27 August 2026.

Prosecutor Revokes Decision on Seized Ship Following Baltic Cable Investigation, Swedish Prosecution Authority, 3 February 2025.