A draft American defence provision would create a formal US Israel defence technology cooperation initiative covering drones, missile defence, cyber, artificial intelligence, space command and industrial partnerships. Scotland is not named in the text, but its launch sites, military ranges, aviation facilities and North Atlantic defence role place it close to the infrastructure such technologies can depend on.
A draft provision in the United States defence bill has raised questions about how future American and Israeli military technology programmes could interact with allied infrastructure in countries such as Scotland.
Section 224 of the draft National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027 is titled the United States Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative. The provision has not become law. It does not merge the United States and Israel, does not create a joint state, and does not name Scotland.
The Scottish question is narrower and more documentable. Scotland already hosts or supports infrastructure connected with NATO activity, US military aviation, maritime patrol, missile testing and emerging commercial space launch. If Washington creates a more formal structure for US Israel defence technology cooperation, Scotland may have reason to examine how its own facilities could be used by wider allied systems in future.
The draft provision would require the US Secretary of Defense to designate an executive agent to synchronise cooperative efforts between the United States and Israel. The listed areas include defence technology research, development, testing, evaluation, integration and industrial cooperation.
The text also refers to identifying jointly developed or Israeli origin technologies with operational utility for possible integration into US systems and programmes of record. It includes provision for collaborative research with government, private sector and academic institutions in both countries, while protecting sensitive technology and national security interests.
The areas named in the draft are wide. They include counter unmanned systems, anti tunnelling and subterranean threats, missile and air defence, artificial intelligence, quantum technology, machine learning, autonomous systems, directed energy, cyber defence, electronic warfare, digital resilience, biotechnology, medical defence, network integration, data fusion, contested logistics, defence industrial base cooperation, manufacturing and co production.
United States Space Command is among the American entities listed in the provision, alongside the Defense Innovation Unit, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Missile Defense Agency, the military departments and other Pentagon bodies.
That scope is what brings Scotland into the discussion. There is no public evidence in the draft bill that any Israeli system is planned for launch, testing or transit through Scotland. There is also no evidence in the text that Scottish spaceports, airports or ranges are assigned any role. The public question is whether Scottish infrastructure could be drawn into future defence technology activity through allied procurement, exercises, launch contracts, aviation transit, range use or industrial supply chains.
Scotland already has several relevant sites.
RAF Lossiemouth in Moray is one of the UK’s main maritime patrol bases. The station is home to the UK’s Poseidon P 8A aircraft, used for maritime patrol and anti submarine operations. The RAF has also stated that a US Naval Support Facility was opened at Lossiemouth in 2024 to provide a permanent hub for US forces returning to the station. The UK Government said a £350 million upgrade programme at Lossiemouth had been completed in 2024.
Glasgow Prestwick Airport provides another point of scrutiny. Prestwick Aviation Services states that Glasgow Prestwick Airport is a US Government Defense Logistics Agency fuel contract location. The airport is publicly owned by the Scottish Government, and its use by military aircraft has been politically sensitive in Scotland, particularly where questions have been raised about flights linked to US operations and the Middle East.
The Scottish Government has previously dealt with questions about Israeli military aircraft and Prestwick. An FOI response published by the Scottish Government in July 2024 refers to correspondence concerning reports of the Israeli air force being banned from using Prestwick Airport. That does not establish any current connection between Prestwick and the draft US provision. It does show that the use of a publicly owned Scottish airport by foreign military aircraft has already been a subject of Scottish public scrutiny.
The Hebrides Range off the north west coast of Scotland is also relevant. QinetiQ describes the MOD Hebrides range as a test and evaluation facility used for complex activity, including live and virtual environments, real time data and support services. In May 2025, QinetiQ said Europe’s largest Integrated Air and Missile Defence exercise, Formidable Shield, had begun at the QinetiQ operated MOD Hebrides range, with ten NATO nations and Australia demonstrating allied interoperability in live fire events against aerial and surface targets.
The range has therefore already been used in the kind of missile defence and allied interoperability environment that overlaps with some categories named in the US draft provision. That does not mean Section 224 would automatically involve the Hebrides Range. It does mean Scotland has an existing defence test environment linked to NATO air and missile defence activity.
Scotland’s spaceports add a further layer. SaxaVord Spaceport in Shetland was granted a spaceport licence by the UK Civil Aviation Authority in December 2023 and a range control licence in April 2024. The range licence allows the company to provide safety critical services before and during launch, including warning notices, surveillance of hazardous areas and rocket flight monitoring. SaxaVord describes itself as a licensed vertical orbital launch site.
Commercial space launch is often presented through jobs, engineering, communications, climate monitoring, scientific payloads and regional development. Those uses are real. Space technology is also frequently dual use. Satellites can support civilian communications, weather observation and environmental monitoring. They can also support military communications, surveillance, data relay, targeting, navigation and operational planning.
Prestwick has also been promoted in the UK space facilities landscape as a future horizontal launch site. Taken together with SaxaVord, Lossiemouth, Prestwick and the Hebrides Range, Scotland sits across several parts of the modern aerospace and defence map: launch, range control, maritime patrol, refuelling, transit, testing and data enabled operations.
None of that proves misconduct by any Scottish body, company, government or partner state. Nor does it prove that Scotland will be used for any particular US Israel defence project. The proper public issue is visibility. Defence and space activity can be shaped by contracts, licences, procurement decisions, payload classifications, flight permissions, commercial partnerships and UK wide national security rules. Those decisions may not always be visible to local communities in plain language.
There is also a constitutional dimension. Defence, foreign affairs, national security, export control and military aviation sit mainly with the UK Government. The Scottish Government has devolved responsibilities in areas such as planning, economic development, transport assets it owns, environmental considerations and public accountability for devolved bodies. That split can leave Scottish communities hosting infrastructure without direct control over every strategic use connected to it.
For communities in Shetland, Moray, Ayrshire, the Western Isles and other parts of Scotland, the questions are practical.
Which military flights use Scottish airports, and for what declared purpose? Which contracts govern refuelling and services at publicly owned Prestwick? What US activity is supported at Lossiemouth? What disclosure is given when NATO exercises use Scottish ranges? Which space payloads launched from Scottish sites will be civilian, commercial, military or dual use? How much information will be available to residents before launch operations, range activity or defence related partnerships proceed?
Those questions do not require speculation about a hidden merger or secret treaty. They arise from public documents, existing infrastructure and the direction of defence technology.
Section 224 of the draft US defence bill may yet be amended, removed or changed as it moves through Congress. If it survives, it would create a more formal route for US Israel defence technology cooperation across fields that overlap with space, missile defence, cyber, autonomy and data systems. Scotland is not named. Scotland is not accused. Scotland is, however, already part of the allied geography in which these systems operate.
The scrutiny should therefore remain careful, sourced and specific. The issue is not whether a draft American bill secretly hands Scotland to another state. It does not. The issue is whether Scotland’s growing space and defence infrastructure is being examined with enough public detail as allied military technology becomes more integrated, more automated and more dependent on launch sites, ranges, airports, data systems and North Atlantic geography.
SOURCES
Download the full chairman’s mark here:
H.R. 8800 FY2027 NDAA Chairman’s Mark PDF
It is a 505-page PDF. Section 224, “United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative”, is listed in the table of contents under Title II, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation. Open the PDF, then search inside it for: Section 224.
House Armed Services Committee, FY27 NDAA Chairman’s Mark, H.R. 8800, Section 224, United States Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative
https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fy27_ndaa_chairmans_mark_-_final.pdf
House Armed Services Committee, Full Committee Markup, FY27 NDAA, H.R. 8800
https://armedservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=6601
GovInfo, H.R. 7540, United States Israel FUTURES Act
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119hr7540ih/html/BILLS-119hr7540ih.htm
AIPAC, The United States Israel FUTURES Act summary
https://www.aipac.org/bill-summaries/america-israel-futures
Royal Air Force, International Poseidon operators convene at RAF Lossiemouth, 30 January 2025
https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/international-poseidon-operators-convene-at-raf-lossiemouth/
UK Government, £350 million programme to upgrade RAF Lossiemouth completed, 16 July 2024
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/350-million-programme-to-upgrade-raf-lossiemouth-completed
Prestwick Aviation Services, Military services
https://prestwickaviationservices.com/services/military/
Scottish Government, FOI 202400405189, Israeli air force banned from using Prestwick airport
https://www.gov.scot/publications/foi-202400405189/
QinetiQ, Formidable Shield begins at QinetiQ operated MOD Hebrides, 12 May 2025
https://www.qinetiq.com/en/news/formidable-shield-begins-at-qinetiq-operated-mod-hebrides
QinetiQ, MOD Hebrides range information
https://www.qinetiq.com/en/hebrides/about
UK Space Facilities, MOD Hebrides Range
https://www.ukspacefacilities.stfc.ac.uk/Pages/MOD-QinetiQ-LTPA-Ranges-and-Facilities—MoD-Hebrides-Range.aspx
Civil Aviation Authority, SaxaVord Spaceport granted range licence, 25 April 2024
https://www.caa.co.uk/newsroom/news/saxavord-spaceport-granted-range-licence-by-civil-aviation-authority/
SaxaVord Spaceport, Range licence granted by Civil Aviation Authority, 25 April 2024
https://saxavord.com/range-licence-granted-by-civil-aviation-authority/
UK Space Facilities, Prestwick Spaceport
https://www.ukspacefacilities.stfc.ac.uk/Pages/Spaceports—Prestwick.aspx
